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Abstract
On November 22, 1963, the United States was shaken to the core by the
assassination o f its young President. In an attempt to provide a grieving nation with some
answers, the new President, Lyndon Johnson, convened a special commission to
investigate the crime and provide a public report. Chaired by the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, Earl Warren, and composed of a wide variety of highly respected
individuals, the Warren Commission would spend several months examining the
evidence of that fateful day in Dallas.
However, when the Warren Commission published its conclusions concerning the
assassination o f President John F. Kennedy, the questions of many Americans remained
unanswered. Dissatisfied with the Commission’s explanations, some called for a new
investigation while others proposed a plethora of theories. However, the public dissent o f
Senator Richard Russell, a former member of the Commission, provided the public with a
legitimate basis for doubt. In an unpublished dissent as well as several interviews, the
powerful Senator cited several reasons for his hesitancy to accept the majority findings o f
the Commission. Unfortunately, very few of the multitudes of volumes on the Warren
Commission and the Kennedy Assassination do more than mention R ussell’s dissent in
passing.
While refraining from posing any theories myself, I hope to be able to examine
the questions Russell raised and the motivations behind them. By briefly tracing
Russell’s early life and career, I wish to emphasize just who this individual was and why
his opinion was so important. A major political figure in Washington politics for almost
forty years, Russell had a well deserved reputation for honesty and integrity. Why then
has the public dissent of such a man, who was privy to all of the evidence before the
Commission, been virtually ignored by history? In examining Russell’s reasoning, I hope
to add a new voice to the unceasing discussion o f the Kennedy assassination.
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Introduction
The murder of the young and charismatic American President on a Dallas
street shook the foundation of the nation to its very core. For days, Americans as a
whole remained glued to their televisions, searching for some answer or explanation.
Then, on November 24th, a mere two days later, the man who could possibly provide
those answers was shot to death on national television. With the murder of Lee
Harvey Oswald, the alleged assassin, any hope of a definitive end to speculation over
Kennedy’s death was forever lost. With Oswald dead, the American public would
never have an opportunity to hear from the popularly convicted murderer himself just
what had motivated the assassination of America’s top executive.
Perhaps as a result of this very uncertainty, the new President, Lyndon Baines
Johnson, established a “blue-ribbon” commission of government officials to
investigate the death of the late President Kennedy. To lend credibility to his
commission, Johnson selected and coerced into serving some of the most respected
politicians of the day. The members, Chief Justice Earl Warren, Senator John
Sherman Cooper (R, KY), Senator Richard B. Russell (D, GA), Congressman Hale
Boggs (D, LA), Congressman Gerald Ford (R, MI), Mr. John McCloy and Mr. Allen
Dulles, would be responsible for providing the grief-stricken public with the “truth”
about that fateful day in Dallas. By the time the Commission’s final report was
published, it would take twenty-six volumes to present all of the non-classified
evidence to the American people. In addition to establishing the truth about the
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events in Dallas, the Commission operated under the assertion that they must do so in
a manner that would prevent unrest both at home and abroad. For this reason, it was
imperative that the public receive some sort of answer as quickly as possible.1
In May of 1964, the members called then FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover,
perhaps the most well-known figure in American law enforcement, to testify.
Hoover’s statements to the Commission provided a measure of reassurance for any
who would doubt the Commission’s as yet unpublished findings. Hoover also
warned the members that they could expect to be doubted and criticized by certain
segments of both the media and the public.2
Not surprisingly, time would prove Hoover correct. Following closely on the
heels of the Commission’s report came the doubts and criticism from every comer of
the nation. In the years since the 1964 publication of the Warren Commission’s
Report on the Assassination o f President Kennedy, the American public has been
bombarded with a wide variety of books and films proposing a host of conspiracy
theories. Almost immediately following the Report’s release, the public was
presented with works such as Edward Jay Epstein’s Inquest3 and Harold Weisburg’s
Whitewash.4 Successive years saw the publication of works by Gerald Posner5,
Sylvia Meagher and even Commissioner, and former President, Gerald Ford. These

1Edward Jay Epstein, Inquest (New York: The Viking Press, 1969), 3-27.
2 Investigation o f the Assassination o f President John F. Kennedy, Hearings Before the President’s
Commission on the Assassination o f President Kennedy (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Printing Office,
1964, vol. 5, (99-101).
3 Edward Jay Epstein, Inquest (New York: The Viking Press, 1966).
4 Harold Weisberg, Whitewash (Frederick, MD: Self-published, 1965).
5 Gerald Posner, Case Closed: Lee Harvey Oswald and the Assassination o f JFK (New York:
Random House, 1993).
6 Sylvia Meagher, Accessories After the Fact, (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1967).
7 Gerald Ford, Portrait o f the Assassin (New York: Ballantine Books, 1965).
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works and the host of others that joined them have led to an almost untouchable
mystique around the events of November 22,1963. The Warren Report has served as
the starting point for generations of critics and conspiracy theorists. And, as Hoover
had hoped, most of these nay-sayers have been dismissed as paranoid lunatics. Yet,
no matter how prepared the establishment was for these doubters, they could never
have foreseen that the first dissenter would be one of their own, Senator Richard
Brevard Russell, Jr., a conservative Democrat from Georgia, and one of the most
powerful men in the country.

5

Chapter I
Richard B. Russell', Jr., Democrat from Winder, GA
The Road to the Senate
Bom on the late autumn afternoon of November 2, 1897 in the little town o f
Winder, Georgia, Richard Brevard Russell, Jr. was destined for great things. The first
son of Judge and Ina Russell, young Richard Russell, Jr. was ensured all of the
benefits of a well established Southern family. Indeed, Russell was descended
through both of his parents from families that had lived in South Carolina and
Georgia since the earliest colonial settlements.8 Although Russell would eventually
be joined by a total of thirteen siblings, six sisters and seven younger brothers, his
position as the eldest son and heir placed the young man in a position of both great
privilege and great pressure.9
For Judge and Ina Russell, family reputation and honor stood above all else.
They taught Russell early and often to “work hard, do well, and be a gentleman.”10 A
strong emphasis on morality and virtue which stressed the importance of honesty,
decency, responsibility, fairness and respect for others augmented this mantra. This
early education would later prove to be the basis for much of Russell’s political

8 Gilbert Fite, Richard B. Russell, Jr.: Senator from Georgia, (Chapel Hill: The University o f North
Carolina Press, 1991), 1.
9 Fite, 7.
10 Fite, 17.
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reputation.11 Late in his Senate career, Russell in describing his personal philosophy
recalled that his father “used to tell his seven sons that all of them could not be
brilliant, all of them could not be successful, but all of them could be honorable.”12
Given Judge Russell’s own political aspirations, education was also important to the
Russell clan. As a young man, Richard Russell developed an early love of reading
that remained with him for the remainder of his life. Most particularity, he
discovered a keen love of history. Writing at nine years old of his love of the subject,
Russell stated that he liked “to read the histories of all countries.”13 Perhaps it is
important to understand this early fascination with the historic record to understand
the importance Russell placed upon it later in life. In general, Russell took from his
reading the idea that knowledge was power; an idea that would persist through his
time in the Senate.14
A frustrated politician, Judge Russell had a grand vision of his eldest son
accomplishing all that he had failed to achieve himself. As a result, the Judge took
young Russell and enrolled him in the Gordon Military Institute in Bamesville,
Georgia, a school known for its rigorous academics and successful alumni. While
Russell had a great interest in reading and history, he did not strive to apply his
intellect to his formal education. Consequently, he struggled with subjects such as
Latin and algebra which did little to hold his interests. Away for the first time from
the daily scrutiny of his family, Russell enjoyed a thriving social life. Well liked by

11 Fite, 8.
12 U.S. Congress, 88th Congress, 2nd Session, Congressional Record 110, pt. 8 (Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1964), 11086.
13 Fite, 12.
14 Fite, 42.
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both his fellow students and the young ladies, Russell’s grades suffered from a lack o f
attention. In danger of failing to graduate, he transferred during his senior year to the
Seventh District Agricultural and Mechanical School. Away from the social
distractions at the Academy, Russell’s grades improved and he graduated in 1914.
Bolstered by his improvement, Russell returned to the Gordon Military Academy and
graduated in May of 1915.15
After graduation, it became clear that Russell had never truly considered any
other career than law and politics. Delighted in his son’s wish to follow in his own
footsteps, Judge Russell assisted his son with admission to the University of Georgia
Lumpkin School of Law. In Athens, Georgia, Russell once again fell victim to the
perils o f an active social life. Well liked by his peers, and pursued by women
Russell’s grades again suffered as a result. During this time, there was no hint of the
diligent and hardworking Senator that would dominate post-World W ar II national
politics. However, Russell did manage to complete his legal studies and graduate in
June of 1918.16 Following a brief, seventy-nine day stint in the Navy, Russell
returned home to Winder to join his father’s legal practice.
However detrimental Russell’s social activities may have been to his
educational career, they provided the young lawyer with the basis for his life-long
political philosophy. Networking and personal contact became the basis for Russell’s
political strategy. After return home to Winder, Russell realized that to be an
effective lawyer, he needed to know the people of his area. Thus, on July 8, 1920, he

15 Fite, 27-30.
16 Fite, 34.
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announced that he was running on the Democratic ticket for the Barrow Country seat
in the Georgia House of Representatives. To Russell, this campaign would provide a
chance to come to know the people of his home county. The social skills that had
made him so popular with his classmates also served to endear him to the voters. The
result o f this “personal contact” method of politics was Russell’s victory over the
incumbent by a strong margin.
For the next ten years, Russell served an apprenticeship of sorts in the Georgia
legislature. During this time, he came to be admired for two main qualities, integrity
and honesty. Fellow politicians learned quickly that Dick Russell’s word was as
binding as a formal contract. To Russell, a commitment, whether oral or written, was
i ^

a commitment not to be broken.

When his entered into a “gentlemen’s agreement”

he strove to “live up to it to the very letter and spirit of the agreement.” 18 This
sentiment would force Russell to honor some rather unpleasant obligations during his
time in the US Senate including his service on the Warren Commission. But, it
would also secure the admiration and respect of his colleagues. Also during this
decade in the Georgia House, Russell developed what would become his major
political goal, honest and efficient government free from favors to or the power of
special interests. Over the span of his political life, Dick Russell continually refused
both aid from special interests and the trading of favors for votes. In general,
Russell’s political quest endeared him more and more to the people he was

17 Fite, 42.
18 Congressional Record 110, pt. 8, 11086.
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representing.19 Finally, Russell’s political apprenticeship ended when he was elected
Governor of the state of Georgia in 1930.20
After only two years as Governor, Russell announced on April 25,1932 that
he would seek election to the United States Senate seat left vacant by the death of
William J. Harris (D, GA). Opposed by Congressman Charles R. Crisp (R, GA),
Russell once again took his campaign directly to the people of Georgia. A successful
and popular governor during his brief time in office, Russell campaigned on the
platform that he wanted to take his crusade for the good of Georgia to the next level.
When election day came, Russell easily defeated Crisp by a landslide in the popular
vote and with seventy-two percent of the county vote. As a result o f this election,
Russell earned the title he would carry for the rest of his life, “Richard B. Russell, Jr.,
Senator from Georgia.”

Senator from Georgia
Arriving in Washington, DC, Russell gained an early advantage over the rest
of the new “freshman” class in the Senate. Owing to the fact that he was completing
an unexpired term rather than beginning a new one, Russell took his oath of office in
January of 1933 rather than March, which gave him seniority over the other freshmen
senators.21 Besides being a new Senator, Russell, at age 35, had the distinction of
replacing Robert M. LaFollette, Jr., (Progressive, WI) age 38, as the “baby” of the

19 Fite, 77.
20 Fite, 76.
21 Fite, 122.
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group.22 Eager to begin his Senate career, Russell managed to talk his way in to an
appointment to the Senate Appropriations Committee, arguably one of the most
powerful committees in Congress. Also, during his first year, Russell was named
chairman of the Appropriations Subcommittee on Agricultural Appropriations, a post
he felt would enable him to improve the situation of Georgia farmers.23
It took very little time for Russell to understand that there were two categories
of senators, the workhorses and the showhorses. Given Russell’s prior preference for
socializing rather than working, one would imagine that he would quickly join the
ranks o f the showhorses. However, sometime during his tenure in the Georgia House,
Russell had discovered a true love of politics. He had come to understand his own
talents and abilities and to enjoy using them to their fullest. He also felt a keen sense
of obligation to the people of Georgia, which needed to be upheld as befitting a
Southern gentleman. And so, Dick Russell, former fraternity brother and socialite,
joined instead the ranks of the workhorses, who preferred working quietly and behind
the scenes to achieve their goals.24 As such, Russell sought to maintain a measure of
anonymity in his Senate work. Often, after devising a compromise amendment, he
would ask a colleague to introduce it so that the other senator would be given the
credit. Russell was so successful in keeping his name out of the media that he was
often not even mentioned in connection to the compromises he brokered.25 Yet, while
the public might be unaware of Russell’s abilities, his colleagues were not. Within

22 Fite, 123.
23 Fite, 124.
24 Fite, 125.
25 Robert Caro, Master o f the Senate: The Years o f Lyndon Johnson (New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
2002), 179.
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the small Senate family, Russell’s ability to defuse situations and untangle knots
became widely recognized. Just as his peers in the Georgia House had once come to
Russell to discuss problems, fellow Senators now approached the quiet but effective
Georgian.26
Russell quickly learned that much of the most important work in the Senate
was accomplished not on the Senate floor, but within the “Inner club,” the unofficial
bipartisan committee that operated much like a corporate board of directors. The
members of this “club” made most of the big decisions in the Senate and played an
important role in deciding who would make the smaller ones.27 Russell moved to
become part of this group and to work within its confines to achieve his goals. By the
end of his time in the Senate, Russell was considered the leader, or central figure, of
this inner circle.28
During his first years in the Senate, Russell became known as an FDR and
New Deal supporter. Having seen the effect of the Depression on Georgia, Russell
agreed with many of Roosevelt’s ideas for aiding the populace. In 1942, FDR drafted
a letter praising Russell for his “steadfastness, untiring efforts and legislative
leadership.”29 The President was not the only politician in Washington to note
Russell’s fine leadership qualities. As World War II drew to a close and the
American public turned weary eyes in search of peace, Russell began to emerge as a
Senate leader. Although still the junior senator from Georgia, there were only

26 Caro, 179.
27 Robert Mann, The Walls o f Jericho: Lyndon Johnson, Hubert Humphrey, Richard Russell and the
Struggle fo r Civil Rights, (New York: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1996), 10.
28 Fite, 126.
29 Fite 157.
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nineteen other members who outranked him. In addition, by 1945, Russell had
replaced Senator Tom Connally (D) of Texas as the head of the Southern Caucus, a
natural progression as southern senators had already begun to turn to Russell for
guidance on issues such as civil rights.30
The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 was both a blow and a blessing
to Russell. The Immigration committee, the only committee he chaired, was placed
under the Judiciary Committee and as a result, Russell lost his position. However,
when the Naval Affairs committee on which Russell sat was rolled into the newly
created Armed Services Committee, Russell was in the position o f sitting on the two
most powerful committee in the Senate, Appropriations and Armed Services. More
importantly, by 1949, Russell was second in seniority for Armed Services and fourth
o 1

for Appropriations.

In addition, by January of that year, Russell was also serving on

the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and as one of two members of the Central
Intelligence Oversight committee.32
In the Fall of 1950, Russell was offered the prestigious position of Majority
Leader, which he rejected. Although such a position would seem to be the obvious
conclusion of his rise to power in the Senate, Russell wanted to preserve his
independence. As Majority Leader, he would be obliged to support administration
policy regardless of his own personal views. Russell was unwilling to place himself
in the position where his ability to evaluate his position would be compromised by
another obligation. However, by this time, Russell was the unofficial leader of the

30 Fite, 198-199.
31 Fite, 221.
32 Fite, 243.

“Inner Club,” and as such, his approval was required for any appointment. After
refusing the post himself, Russell gave a nod to Ernest MacFarland’s (D, AZ)
appointment as Majority Leader. Russell also secured the Majority W hip’s spot for
his young friend, Lyndon Johnson (D, TX) of Texas.33
In addition to his position of political power, Russell was revered for his
understanding of the workings, the history and the traditions of the Senate. He was a
master at aiding friends with pet projects. For the newcomers, Russell provided
excellent tutelage in the workings of the Senate. When young Senator Edward
Kennedy (D, MA) first arrived in Washington DC, he received one key piece of
advice from his elder brother, Senator John F. Kennedy (D, MA). Kennedy was told
to go visit with Russell if he wanted to get along in the Senate.
Yet, for all of his work as the “elder statesman,” Russell was a major political
player for the majority of his time in Washington. Serving on the Armed Services
Committee provided Russell with the opportunity to influence some o f the defining
factors and moments in post-war history. In terms of foreign policy, Russell was
guided by three basic assumptions. First, he believed, however erroneously, in the
superiority of the “Anglo-Saxon culture.” Second, Russell had always been a fierce
patriot, defying anyone to attack or criticize his nation. And finally, he believed
fervently that the US needed to maintain a strong military defense.34 One result of
this last belief was Russell’s support for the National Security Act o f 1947 which
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unified the armed forces, established the cabinet-level position of Secretary of
Defense and provided for the creation of the Central Intelligence Agency.35
For more than the next twenty years, Russell would play a role in shaping the defense
of the nation he held so dear from those he viewed as threats. Journalist Jack Bell
wrote during the 1960s that in the field of national defense, Russell was “considered
to be the greatest living expert on the military defense and establishment of the
United States."36 During the Cold War, Russell played a key role in shaping the
'y n

military budget and in “keeping America militarily strong.”

To Russell, the chief

threat to US security was the Soviet Union. Even during World War II, Russell had
never possessed any confidence in Soviet goodwill or honesty. He considered the
Soviets a deceptive lot bent on adventurism and expansion as well as the source of
“all our troubles.”38

The MacArthur Hearings
Shortly after taking over as chairman of the Armed Services Committee,
Russell became involved in the controversy surrounding the dismissal of General
Douglas MacArthur as commander of American forces in Korea. Seeking a way to
minimize damage to the Democratic party and to calm the nation, Russell proposed a
joint Armed Services and Foreign Affairs probe into MacArthur’s dismissal. As the
senior chairman, Russell assumed leadership of the hearings when they began on May

35 Fite, 221.
36 Caro, 180.
37 Caro, 180.
38 Fite, 254.
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3, 1951. When news of the investigation became public, a Washington source was
quoted as stating that “if anyone could protect national interest against those who
sought personal or political gain,” from the process, “Dick Russell can.”39 However,
shortly after the hearings began, Russell grew disheartened by the partisan sparing
dominating the investigation. In an action that would have an eerie echo years later,
Russell drafted a letter of resignation as chairman on May 16, 1951. Citing his
inability to maintain a non-partisan investigation against the Republican quest for
political advantage, Russell wished to be replaced. However, the letter was never
sent and Russell remained in charge of the investigation.
Concerned with national security issues, the hearings were closed to the
public, although some censored testimony was published. However, by investigating
the situation and allowing the popular General MacArthur to discuss the situation in
Korea, Russell had managed to turn the public’s attention away from the dismissal
and back to the Far East. With this skillful maneuver, Russell was able to diffuse a
situation that could have been horribly divisive to a nation in need of unity. In
emphasizing the need for such unity and by striking a compromise between public
disclosure and national security, Russell was able to calm public fervor and
discontent as well as to minimize damage to his own party.40
The hearings also helped to improve Russell’s reputation. Although
MacFarland was the official majority leader, the public became aware of Dick
Russell’s position as defacto leader of the Senate. The investigation also served to

39 Fite, 256-7.
40 Fite, 264.
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enhance Russell’s national image. Far more people outside of Georgia were aware of
Russell at the conclusion of the hearings in June 1951 than in April of that year.41

The 1952 Democratic Primary
Perhaps as a result of this newfound national recognition, Russell was
approached by the Southern Democrats to run for the Presidential nomination in
1952. Seeking a candidate from the South, the Southern portion of the party could
find none stronger than Richard Russell. Reluctant at first to throw his hat into the
ring, Russell finally announced that he was an official candidate for the nomination
on February 28, 1952. Running on the same platform that had served him well his
entire career, Russell claimed to stand for strong defense, careful public spending and
a government free from fraud, corruption and divided loyalties. In terms of potential
candidates, Russell seemed to be ideal, except that he was from the South. Those
campaigning against him portrayed Russell as “a loyal, moderate Democrat who had
outstanding abilities as a legislator, but who was irreparably handicapped by his
southern location and attitudes,” most specifically his States’ Rights position and his
opposition to any Federal civil rights legislation.42 Indeed, his opponents were
careful about criticizing Russell too harshly as they would need his influence and
power in the Senate if they won the election. When the Democratic nominee was
finally selected, Russell lost to Adlai Stevenson. In evaluating the candidates, a
Washington Star reporter was quoted as stating that “Kefauver was a lightweight,

41 Fite, 264.
42 Fite, 274.
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Barkley and Rayburn were too old, Harriman was too rich, Kerr was too oily and
Russell was too far South.” Well aware that his victory was largely due to Russell’s
Southern heritage and not his own merits, Stevenson was quick to offer the Vice
Presidential spot to Russell. But, ever mindful of his political independence, Russell
declined for the same reasons he had refused to serve as Majority Leader earlier in his
career.43
The next decade and a half would see Russell’s actual power begin to ebb
even as his reputation grew. During this time, Russell would watch his protege,
Lyndon Johnson elected both Vice President and President, he would see the
inevitable passage of a Federal civil rights bill and he would serve on the commission
investigating the assassination of President Kennedy. Finally, on January 3, 1969,
Russell was rewarded for his thirty-six years of Senate service. With the retirement
of Carl Hayden, Russell became the most senior member of the Senate. That same
day, he was sworn in as President Pro Tempore of the Senate. Serving for two more
years before his death on January 21, 1971, Russell was revered by his colleagues for
“his fairness, integrity, wisdom, help to colleagues on special projects and
steadfastness in protecting the traditions of the Senate.”44

The Battle Against Civil Rights Legislation
During his decades of service in the Senate, one particular issue seemed to
dominate Russell’s legislative career, the fight against Federal Civil Rights

43 Fite, 296.
44 Fite, 465.
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legislation. Bom to an old, if improvised Southern family, Russell was raised to hold
many of the same racial views as the majority of his peers. In his youth, Russell lived
in a strictly segregated area of Georgia where the few black families were relegated to
positions of social and economic inferiority. Although he often spoke fondly and
respectfully of his family’s black servants, Russell always saw them as servants, not
equals. Bom into a world where the social order was dictated by adults, Russell, like
many of his peers, accepted this genteel white supremacy without question.45
As an adult, Russell held fast to this view even as the world changed around
him. While faithful to his belief in the superiority of the white race, Russell was far
from being a rabid racist. Always respectful of the black community and careful to
avoid such pejorative terms as “nigger,” Russell nevertheless continued to hold the
elitist and paternalistic attitude once so common to his social group. In keeping with
this genteel attitude, Russell vigorous supported anti-lynching legislation while
denouncing those who would use violence to intimidate the black community. While
he hoped that blacks could make economic gains and improve their lives, the Georgia
Senator firmly believed that white and black societies needed to be strictly
segregated for the preservation of both races. For Russell, integration could only lead
to degeneration and ruin for both groups 46
In general, Russell’s views on racial issues stemmed more from cultural
inheritance and southern tradition than from any real objective evaluation of the issue.
Although these beliefs were an ingrained part of his character, Russell felt that it was

45 Fite, 14, 74.
46 U.S. Congress, 88th Congress, 2nd Session, Congressional Record 110, pt. 3 (Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1964), 4069.
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unworthy and unbecoming for southern leaders to use the race issue for political gain.
Thus, instead of joining with the more outspoken politicians like Thomas Watson (D,
GA) and Eugene Talmadge (D, GA), Russell preferred to remain silent on the issue.47
However, as time passed, attempts at silence proved futile. With the end of
World War II, the cry for equality and civil rights began to build within the black
community. In 1948, President Truman made an initial attempt at federal legislation
which demanded a response from the Southern bloc, now under the leadership of the
young Senator from Georgia. Mustering his colleagues, Russell advocated opposition
to the proposed legislation for several reasons. Besides his firm belief in the
necessity of segregation, Russell appealed to a deep-held southern belief in the
preservation of States’ Rights. For Russell, “the fundamental rights guaranteed to the
individual citizen” by the United States Constitution, most importantly life, liberty
and property, “protects all citizens, whether members of minorities or so-called
majorities. Efforts to twist or distort these constitutional rights so as to penalize one
citizen for the benefit of another” is a dangerous and destructive procedure.
As time passed, it became more and more difficult to successfully mount a
campaign against the growing call for civil rights legislation. Yet, throughout this
period, Russell remained committed to the preservation of segregation. For him, the
political use of civil rights was nothing more than an attempt to “use the South as a
whipping boy for political purposes in other areas.”49 Even as late as the early 1960s,
Russell was still advocating the rejection of civil rights legislation on the grounds that

47 Fite, 75.
48 Cavin McLeod Logue, ed. Voice o f Georgia: Speeches o f Richard B. Russell 1928-1969. (Macon,
GA: Mercer University Press, 1997), 325.
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it was an “insidious campaign to harass the southern people and to destroy the
southern way of life” by those seeking national recognition.50 In a 1964 letter to a
constituent, Russell stated that he had long believed that “the only fair means of
bringing about a permanent solution to the racial problem is through a more equitable
distribution of the Negro race throughout all states and sections of the country. Of
course, this matter is shot through and through with hypocrisy, and some of those
who demand the right to tell the South how to deal with our very real problem want
no more of the Negro problem for themselves than they can possibly avoid.”51
By the time Lyndon Johnson proposed the 1964 Civil Rights Act, Russell had
modified his position to emphasize the States Rights appeal over the gentile elitism.
For Russell, the “Negro problem” needed to be handled at the state level. Any
interference by the Federal government would only fuel the passions of the
population causing additional strife. Russell, like many States’ Rights supporters,
believed that the Federal Government needed to allow the states to deal with internal
matters on an individual basis. Unfortunately for Russell, the majority of the
American public had already been awakened to the injustices wrought upon the black
population. Although he would try valiantly to once again prevent Federal
legislation, not even Russell could stem the tide of progress.

49 Logue, 331.
50 Logue, 350.
51 Richard B. Russell to Andrew J. Moye, III, 24 March 1964, Series XIII; Subseries A Box
Assassinations Commission Correspondence Nov 1963- Oct. 1964 ; File 7 (Richard B. Russell Papers,
Special Collections Division, Richard B. Russell Memorial Library, University o f Georgia, Athens,
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Yet, while many of Russell’s Senate colleagues differed with his opinion on
the race issue, they still had nothing but respect for the Senator from Georgia. Even
during the fiercest moments of the debate, fiery orators such as Hubert Humphrey
though critical of Russell’s position remained adamant in their personal respect for
the man. Michael Mansfield (D, MT), the majority leader during the debate and a
supporter of the bill, stated on the Senate floor that “the distinguished Senator from
Georgia is a man of honor and a man of determination. When he gives his word, it is
as solid as gold, and when he is determined, he is like a bull in a china shop.”

In an

ideal display of parliamentary behavior, the Senate was able to debate the bill that
would change the lives of thousands without degenerating into personal attacks and
insults.
In a speech not long after the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, Russell
defended his opposition by explaining that it grew from “a profound conviction that,
in the long run,” the bill would “only prove harmful to the country and curtail and
destroy the rights of all Americans of every race.” Yet, Russell continued, he still had
“faith in the soundness” of the American institutions and “in the inherent good
judgment of the American people.” It was his hope that in time, the American public
would “turn back the trend toward statism and enforce conformity in every activity of
life.” However, true to his character, Russell reminded his listeners that as the
statutes were now law, it became the duty of all Americans “as good citizens to learn
to live with them for as long as they” stand as law. Even though he and his followers
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did not agree with the direction the government had turned, it was the duty of “good
and patriotic citizens” during times of tension and unrest “to avoid all violence” and
“defiance” for the good of the nation.

“Landslide Lyndon”
In 1948, the new crop of US Senators included several “standout members”
such as “Clinton P. Anderson (D, NM), who had resigned as President Truman’s
Secretary of Agriculture to run for the Senate in New Mexico; University of Chicago
economics professor Paul H. Douglas (D, IL), who had been an authentic marine
hero in World War II; Russell B. Long (D, LA), son of the Louisiana “Kingfish”;
Rep. Estes Kefauver (D, TN), who had bested the powerful Crump machine in
Memphis to win in Tennessee; oil baron and former Oklahoma governor Robert S.
Kerr (D, OK); and the liberal former Minneapolis mayor Hubert H. Humphrey (D,
MN), fresh from a fiery civil rights speech that prompted a Southern walkout at the
Democratic National Convention.”54 In such company, the former Congressman
from Texas with the reputation for a mediocre work ethic did not seem particularly
promising. Nonetheless, Lyndon B. Johnson was elected to the Senate by 87 late
arriving votes earning him the nickname “Landslide Lyndon.”55
Once in the Senate, Johnson worked tirelessly to improve both his standing
and reputation. Unlike the carefree days in the House, Johnson’s staff now regularly
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worked fourteen to sixteen hour days. A shrewd politician, Johnson understood the
politics of the Senate and realized that Dick Russell would be the key to success.
With this in mind, Johnson sought an appointment to the Armed Services Committee.
Johnson was later reported to have stated that he “knew that there was only one way
to see Russell everyday - and that was to get a seat on his committee.”56 Casual
acquaintances since Johnson’s days in the House, the two men now became close
friends as they worked together on the Armed Services Committee.

In a

demonstration of their close relationship and Russell’s position in the Senate, Johnson
signed over to Russell his proxy vote in “any and all matters” before the Committee.57
Johnson continually courted Russell’s good opinion. Realizing that the
bachelor Senator might be somewhat lonely in Washington away from his family in
Georgia, Johnson and his wife, Lady Bird, made Russell a frequent visitor to their
home. While Russell was impressed with Johnson’s intelligence and political savvy,
he had a genuine appreciation for Lady Bird’s classic southern charm. Over the next
several years, Russell was such a frequent guest at the Johnson home that he became
known as “Uncle Dick” to the Johnson daughters. Given the distinct nature of the
friendship between the two men, it was no surprise that Johnson was the only Senator
to travel to Winder when Russell’s beloved mother died.58
Yet, while Johnson was courting Russell’s favor for his own interests, Russell
was attempting to groom the Texas Senator for his own purposes. Russell felt that
Johnson would be an ideal choice to bridge the gulf between the Northern and
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Southern delegations in the Senate. While Johnson, at this point in his career, held
many of the basic white Southern attitudes towards race, he was not so firmly
associated with the Southern bloc that he could not deal effectively with the Northern
moderates and liberals.59 As a result, Russell did everything within his immense
power to promote the career of his young protege. In 1950, after approving
MacFarland as Majority Leader, Russell proposed Johnson to serve as Majority
Whip, a position of little actual power but some prestige. Then, when MacFarland
was defeated in 1952 and the Republicans took control of the Senate, Russell made
sure that Johnson was named Minority Leader of the new Congress.60
After Johnson assumed the position of Minority Leader and later Majority
Leader, the two friends worked together to strengthen Democratic power in the
Senate. Their fellow senators often remarked that the two men could been together
whispering and consulting over policy matters. Together, they formed a center of
great power in the Senate with Russell guiding and pushing Johnson’s career at every
opportunity.
However, over the years, Johnson had developed his own political strategy.
When he was defeated by fellow Senator John F. Kennedy for the Democratic
Presidential nomination, Johnson, against Russell’s advice, accepted the Vice
Presidential spot. Russell feared that by accepting the nomination, Johnson was
going to be forced to become entangled in Kennedy’s Northern policies. Although
Russell had a warm personal relationship with Kennedy and great affection for his
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wife, he opposed the vast majority of the young politician’s policies. As a result,
Russell refused to actively campaign for the two men in spite of much cajoling on
Johnson’s part. It was only at the very end of the race when it appeared that the
Democrats might lose Texas, Johnson’s home state, that Russell took to the road. If
anything, Russell’s outrage over the manner in which a Houston crowd had treated
Lady Bird Johnson had more impact on his decision to help than anything else. Thus,
with Russell’s help, the Democrats were able to carry Texas by a narrow margin.61
Now that Johnson was safely secured in the executive branch of government it
seemed as though the interaction between the two men would come to end. And yet,
the campaign in Texas would not be the last time that Johnson would call on his old
friend Dick Russell to lend both his name and his reputation to Johnson’s own
interests. The November 22, 1963 assassination of President Kennedy would force
Russell yet again to come to the aid of his friend and former protege.
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Chapter 2
Dallas and After
November 22,1963
On November 22, 1963, President John F. Kennedy and his wife arrived at
Love Field in Dallas Texas. Maximizing his exposure in Texas, Kennedy was to
deliver a speech at the local Trade Mart before flying to Austin for a Democratic fund
raiser. Eager to demonstrate the young President’s popularity, Texas Governor John
Connally (D) and Kenneth O’Donnell, special assistant to the President, had planned
a motorcade through the Dallas business district. In the final itinerary made public on
November 19th, forty-five minutes were allowed for the trip from Love Field to the
Trade Mart.62
As the party departed the airfield, the President and Mrs. Kennedy rode in the
back of a black, open-top limousine with Governor Connally riding in the front
passenger seat. The car carrying Vice President Johnson and his wife followed
several cars behind the Presidential limousine. Leaving Love Field at approximately
11:50am central standard time, the motorcade moved through residential areas,
stopping several times to greet well-wishers. While the procession moved into the
downtown district, the gathering crowd began to line the streets. As the Presidential
limousine slowed for the sharp turn onto Elm Street, a Secret Service agent in the
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motorcade radioed a colleague at the Trade Mart that the President would be arriving
in approximately five minutes. Just seconds later, as the motorcade passed through
Dealey Plaza, an open garden area marking the western boundary of the business
district, shots rang out. As time seemed to slow, President Kennedy slumped slightly
forward, prevented from falling over by the stiff back-brace required by an old war
injury. Governor Connally, who had been facing the crowd, turned towards the rear
of the car before being struck by a bullet in the back. Mrs. Connally, sitting next to
her husband, pulled the Governor down onto her lap. Mere seconds later another shot
struck the President causing a massive and fatal head wound. Severely injured, the
young President fell into the First Lady’s lap.63
Momentarily stunned by the events, the Secret Service agents in the
motorcade sprang into action. Agents assigned to the Vice-President pulled Johnson
to the floor of the his car and bodily covered him. Agent Kellerman, riding in the
front of the Presidential limousine, realizing the President had been hit, ordered the
driver to find a hospital immediately. Rapidly, the Presidential detail headed toward
Parkland Memorial Hospital only four miles away. In the trauma center, doctors took
note of the large head wound and a small wound, about one-fourth of an inch in
diameter, in the President’s neck. In a vain attempt to save Kennedy’s life, the
doctors performed an emergency tracheotomy by enlarging the neck wound to
facilitate breathing. At 1pm Dallas time, after the Last Rites had been performed by a
Roman Catholic Priest, President John F. Kennedy was pronounced dead.

62 The Warren Commission Report: Report o f President’s Commission on the Assassination o f
President John F. Kennedy, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1964), 2. (hereafter cited as WC Report)
63 WC Report, 3.

28
As word of the President’s assassination spread, Vice President Johnson was
taken from Parkland Memorial to Love Field under close guard. Shortly thereafter,
Mrs. Kennedy accompanied the body of her late husband back to the Presidential
th

airplane. Once onboard Air Force One, Lyndon Johnson became the 36 President at
2:38pm central standard time. Arriving in Washington shortly before 6pm, eastern
standard time, Kennedy’s body was immediately taken to Bethesda Naval Hospital
for a complete autopsy. During the course of the examination, a previously unknown
wound in Kennedy’s back was noted. Officially, the cause of death was listed as a
“gunshot wound, head.”64
As the President was rushed to the nearby hospital, Dealey Plaza erupted in
total chaos. Although witnesses differed on the location of the shooter, attention
quickly centered on the Texas School Book Depository building. Several eyewitness
claimed to have noticed shots coming from the sixth floor of the Depository. One
spectator even stated that he had noticed a slim Caucasian male leaning out of the
sixth floor window with a rifle. By 12:45pm central time, a description of the alleged
assailant was broadcast over police radio. Shortly after the shooting, a Dallas
motorcycle officer entered the Book Depository building and encountering the
supervisor moved towards the stairs. On the second floor, the officer encountered a
man in the lunchroom. When asked, the supervisor identified the individual as Lee
Harvey Oswald, a building employee. As the officer proceeded up the stairs, Oswald
moved downstairs and left the building, boarding a local bus about seven minutes
later. With traffic at a standstill because of the shooting, Oswald exited the bus a few
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minutes later and proceeded on foot for several blocks before hiring a taxi. At
1:45pm, Oswald, matching the description on the police radio, was apprehended at
the Texas Theater and arrested.65
Just about the same time President Kennedy was pronounced dead, the Dallas
Police discovered a “sniper’s nest” in the sixth floor warehouse of the Depository
building. At approximately 1pm, three empty cartridges and a paper sack were
recovered in the southeast comer of the building. Twenty minutes later, the officers
discovered a bolt-action Mannlicher-Carcano rifle with a telescopic sight between
two rows of boxes in the northwest comer of the building. When Oswald was
arrested less than an hour later, the investigation seemed well underway. The
authorities now had the location, the weapon and a possible suspect who fit the
description of an eye-witness.66 Just after 7pm Dallas time, Oswald was charged in
the death of Dallas Patrolman Tippit who had been murdered shortly after the
assassination. After three different police line-ups, Oswald was formally charged
with the assassination of the President at 11:26pm Dallas time.
However, the questions surrounding the assassination of President Kennedy
seemed destined to remain unanswered.

From the time he was arrested until about

1lam on Sunday morning, Oswald spent approximately 12 hours under interrogation
never confessing to either charge. Although aware of his Miranda rights, Oswald
made no request for legal representation during his questioning. Concerned about
statements made during a press conference, representatives of the American Civil
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Liberties Union approached the police to ensure the suspect was not being deprived
of counsel. Although Oswald tried over the course of the weekend to reach defense
attorney Jon Abt in New York, he was unable to secure representation. When visited
by a member of the Dallas Bar Association on Saturday, November 23, Oswald
refused an offer to secure counsel expressing a preference for Abt.67
In keeping with Dallas custom, Oswald was to be transferred from the police
station to the county jail after being indicted. The decision was made to transfer the
prisoner on Sunday morning around 10am. By 8:30 that morning, the press, aware of
the pending transfer, had begun to gather in the basement of the station. Although
threats had been made against the alleged assassin’s life, the police decided to
proceed with the transfer as planned, moving Oswald through the crowd of reporters
in the basement. Just ten feet into the basement, Jack Ruby, a local nightclub owner,
stepped forward and with a .38 caliber revolver fired a single, fatal shot at Oswald.
Thus, three days after the assassination of the President, the alleged assassin was
himself shot to death taking any answers he possessed about Kennedy’s death to his
grave.68

The FBI Report
Only hours after the death of the President, the FBI under the direction of the
infamous J. Edgar Hoover became involved in the investigation. In a memo dated
4:01pm on November 22, Hoover relayed to his chief subordinates that he had
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informed Robert Kennedy, the late President’s brother and the Attorney General of
the United States, that the FBI felt they “had the man who killed the President down
in Dallas.”69 Hoover went on to describe Oswald’s actions immediately following the
assassination including the murder of Officer Tippit. As the FBI continued to follow
the investigation, a debate arose in Washington inner circles about how to handle the
matter. Some wanted to publish the FBI findings, other wanted a full Congressional
investigation. Speaking with Hoover on the morning of November 25, the day after
Oswald’s death, the new President expressed doubts about a Federal investigation.
Complaining about a pending Washington Post editorial calling for a Presidential
commission, Johnson claimed that the government could not go “checking up on
every shooting scrape in the country.”

70

Instead, Johnson expressed a preference for

a quick FBI investigation with a final report to the Attorney General. Besides his
desire to keep the investigation as far from the White House as possible, Johnson was
concerned about jurisdictional questions. To him, the assassination was a state matter
to be handled by the State Attorney General, Wagner Carr, a man he characterized as
“young and able and prudent” as well as “very cooperative” with the FBI. Carr
would conduct a court of inquiry in Dallas, as there now would be no official trial of
Oswald. To Johnson, a Presidential Commission “that’s not trained hurts more than it
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helps.”71 Obviously, the new President was very concerned about how the
assassination of his predecessor was to be investigated.
In a memo dated the same day, Deputy Attorney General Nicholas
Katzenbach addressed several of the key concerns the White House had about the
investigation. To Bill Moyers, a senior FBI official, Katzenbach stated that his
primary concern was that “the public must be satisfied that Oswald was the assassin”
and that he acted alone.72 In an attempt to lend a sense of dignity to the investigation,
Katzenbach offered two suggestions. First, the reputation of the FBI must be put
squarely behind the investigation in order to account for the disparities between
Bureau statements and those of the Dallas police. Or, “the only other step would be
the appointment of a Presidential Commission of unimpeachable personnel to review
and examine the evidence and announce its conclusion.”
Debate continued in Washington even after the November 25 announcement
by State Attorney General Wagner Carr of a court of inquiry in Dallas to publicly
evaluate the evidence amassed by the FBI investigation. On November 26, Senator
Everett M. Dirksen (R, IL) called for the Senate Judiciary Committee to conduct a
full investigation into the assassination. The following day, Congressman Charles R.
Goodell (R, NY) proposed a joint committee of seven Senators and seven
Congressmen to investigate the murder. In the face of such debate, President Johnson
and the FBI had few options. Finally, on November 29, Johnson took a step he

71 LBJ/Hoover phone conversation, 1.
72 Department o f Justice, “Memorandum fo r Mr. M oyers” (November 225, 1963), GA 75-226, Exhibit
76 (Department o f Justice Records Branch; Copy from Harold Weisberg Archive, Hood College,
Maryland), 1. (hereafter cited as DOJ Memo)
73 DOJ Memo, 1.

33
loathed to take and appointed a Presidential Commission “to ascertain, evaluate and
report on” the particulars of the assassination.

Following Katzenbach’s advice,

Johnson attempted to create a Commission of highly respected members, naming the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Earl Warren as chairman. Senator John Sherman
Cooper, former Ambassador to India and a leading liberal Republican joined Hale
Boggs, the House Majority Whip and Gerald Ford, Chairman of the House
Republican Conference. Rounding out the assemblage were Allen Dulles, former
Central Intelligence Agency director and John J. McCloy, the former High
Commission for Germany and President of the World Bank. The final commission
member would be Johnson’s old mentor, Senator Richard Russell of Georgia, a
powerful and distinguished figure in Washington.74
With the establishment of what would become known as the Warren
Commission, Johnson had struck a fine balance between political expediency and
political survival. Eager to move on with the business of governing, Johnson needed
to find a way to silence the swirls of rumors surrounding the death of his predecessor.
The Commission would provide the public with the answers they craved without
creating more chaos and questions. In Executive Order No. 11130, the document
formally convening the Commission, Johnson stated that the purpose of the body
would be to “examine the evidence developed by the Federal Bureau of Investigations
and any additional evidence that may hereafter come to light or be uncovered by
federal or state authorities; to make such further investigation as the Commission
finds desirable; to evaluate all the facts and circumstances surrounding such
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assassination, including the subsequent violent death of the man charged with the
assassination, and to report” the findings.75 Thus, although the Warren Commission
was to provide the definitive version of the assassination, it would use the FBI as its
investigative arm. Johnson was able to ensure as much as possible that Hoover and
FBI officials would remain in control of the situation.
In a memo dated November 29, the same day the Commission was
announced, Hoover described to his subordinates both the composition of the
Commission and the state of the investigation which was totally focused on Oswald.
Hoover claimed to have assured the President that the FBI hoped to have the formal
investigation completed within a few days. Specifically, the only area still
outstanding was the question of Oswald’s recent trip to Mexico. However, he felt
confident stating conclusively that there was “no question” that Oswald was the
assassin. More specifically, only seven days after the assassination, Hoover told
Johnson that there had been three shots and three hits. In the FBI’s view, the
President had been hit by the first and third bullets, with the second striking Connally.
Hoover even went so far as to say that if Connally had not been seated in the car, the
second bullet would also have struck the President. Finally, the FBI’s key conclusions
were that Oswald was the assassin; Connally was hit after the President; and if
Connally had not turned after the first shot, Kennedy would have been hit by the
second shot. The Cuban connection was still under investigation.76
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On December 9, 1963, Warren was provided with official copies of the FBI
report into the Kennedy investigation. Katzenbach, in delivering the documents to
the Chief Justice urged that the Commission issue a brief statement stating that the
FBI report established “beyond a reasonable doubt that Lee Harvey Oswald shot
President Kennedy,” and that the FBI had conducted “ an exhaustive investigation”
into any Oswald conspiracy and had concluded that he had acted alone.77 In fact, the
final report, submitted to the Commission as Commission Document 1 (CD-I) was
compiled with remarkable speed. Less than a full month after the assassination of the
President and the murder of the alleged assassin, the FBI was ready and willing to
make definitive statements as to method and motive. In terms of specifics, the report
established that there were three shots fired and three hits. Two bullets hit Kennedy
and one struck Governor Connally. Discussing Oswald, the report detailed his
background including his connections with the Soviet Union and Cuba as well as his
military service and training as a “sharpshooter.”78

Russell’s Appointment
Richard Russell, shocked and dismayed by the assassination of the President,
had no idea of the role his former protege wanted him to play. At the time Kennedy
was shot, Russell was reading the wire feed for the Associated Press and United Press
services in the anteroom behind the Senate chambers. Although stunned by the news
of the assassination, Russell thought first of national defense as would befit the
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Chairman of the Armed Services Committee. After a harried phone call to Secretary
of Defense Robert McNamara to ensure the defensive status of the nation, Russell sat
with friend and colleague Mike Mansfield in the radio/television gallery. Sickened
by the news, Russell remarked that it was a “dastardly crime which had stricken a
brilliant dedicated statesman at the very height of his powers.” For Russell, Kennedy
had not only been a President, but a former Senate coworker with whom Russell had
had some personal dealings. It would be hard to imagine that Russell was not also
concerned with the changes facing his friend, Lyndon Johnson. However, over the
next few grief-stricken days, one fact made the greatest impact on Russell, the
deportment of Jacqueline Kennedy. In a letter of condolence dated November 26th,
Russell wrote:
At the danger o f being thought presumptuous, I am writing to
express my unbounded admiration o f your demeanor and every act
indeed during the past four tragic days.
No queen, born o f the purple, could have acquitted herself
more admirably. Your calm dignity vanished the hysteria which
threatened millions o f your fellow Americans who followed your every
movement on the television screen.
I am so old-fashioned as to believe that those who have
departed this earth still know what transpires here, and I therefore
believe that President Kennedy was prouder o f you then than he has
ever been in this life. Only a great lady in the finest tradition o f the
old school could have displayed such magnificent courage.
Thank you fo r what you did to steady our national morale and
•
.
79
to improve our nation s image...
As evidenced by Russell’s eloquent words to the former First Lady, one of hiss
foremost concerns was the stability of the nation. As he had demonstrated during the
tumultuous days of the MacArthur hearins, the steady morale of the nation must be
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preserved at all costs. Eventually, it was this desire to act in the best interests of the
nation that ensnared Russell into serving on the Warren Commission.
When first approached by Johnson on November 29, Russell politely refused
to serve. He told the new President to “get someone else,” to “get John Stennis (D,
MI).”

OA

Johnson continued to cajole his old mentor by claiming to need a “good

states rights’ man” to balance out John Sherman Cooper, the Republican senatorial
selection. When Russell repeatedly declined, Johnson emphatically declared that
“this country has a lot of confidence in you” and appealed to Russell’s sense of
national duty and obligation. Still unable to convince the Georgian to serve, Johnson
decided to go ahead and announce the names of the seven members, including the
reluctant Senator from Georgia. Russell, shocked by Johnson’s actions, again tried to
decline, citing a lack of confidence in Warren and an unwillingness to serve with the
Chief Justice. Besides a general dislike for the Chief Justice, Russell felt that Warren
had compromised the integrity of the Supreme Court with the 1954 Brown v. The
Board o f Education decision.81 In Russell’s mind, Warren was “the one person most
directly responsible for the prejudice against the South that has arisen” in recent years
and “responsible also for a great deal of the bitterness directed against the true
conservatives.”82 Cutting to the heart of the matter, Johnson again appealed to
Russell’s patriotism insisting that the Senator would “do everything” he could in
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service to his country. In the face of the famous “Johnson treatment,” Russell gave
way and agreed to serve though he did warn the President that he would have little
time to devote to the issue.83

The Commission
With the Commission now established, the seven members faced the
enormous task of explaining to the American public who had killed their young
President and what had motivated the crime. As the members gathered to begin the
task laid before then, it became clear that their purpose was not just to uncover the
truth, but to act in accordance with national interests. For Allen Dulles, former CIA
director, the goal seemed to be to silence the rumors abounding both at home and
abroad. John J. McCloy, an international businessman, felt it was vital to “show the
world that American is not a banana republic, where a government can be changed by
conspiracy.”84 Dispelling the doubts that had been cast over American institutions
was the primary concern of Senator Cooper while Congressman Ford wished to quell
any damaging rumors. Taken together, it would seem that while the explicit purpose
of the Commission was to illuminate the facts, the overriding goal w as to protect
national interests by eradicating potentially damaging rumors and suspicions.

oc

Almost immediately after Kennedy’s death was announced, rumors began to
surface alleging that he had been killed by the Soviets, the Cubans o r even
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Communist factions within the United States. The death of Lee Harvey Oswald only
days later fed this vicious rumor mill until it threatened to explode into chaos. As the
grieving public clamored for answers, the new Commissioners knew that they needed
to replace fiction with fact.
As November gave way to December the Warren Commission staff debated
the structure of both the investigation and the subsequent Report. At their initial
organization meeting, the Commissioners decided to engage a General Counsel to
mmanageed the invesstigaation andddtaff. J. Lee Rankin, a New York City attorney,
was drafted to fill this function. By the time the final Report was completed, Rankin
would be charged with overseeing not only the running of the investigation and the
drafting of the report, but examining witnesses before the Commission, managing the
staff and acting as a liaison between the Commission and various agencies. In a very
real way, Lee Rankin was the embodiment of the Warren Commission. Although the
seven distinguished Commissioners would lend their time and their reputations to the
investigation, most of the actual work would be completed by a staff of lawyers under
Rankin’s direction. Eventually, it was decided that the investigation and the Report
would cover six different areas. First, there would be a basic discussion of the facts
of the assassination. The second section would narrow the focus to the identity of the
assassin, Lee Harvey Oswald. Next, the third area would focus on Oswald’s
biography. Any possible conspiracies would be dealt with in section four. The fifth
area, originally the final section, would examine Oswald’s murder by Jack Ruby.
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Later, the Commission requested the addition of a final section that addressed issues
of Presidential security.
After the structure was decided, teams of lawyers were assigned to each area.
While a team of “senior” lawyers, high-priced, high profile attorneys, was assembled,
the majority of the work would fall to the “junior” lawyers. Subsequently, each
section was assigned one senior and one junior attorney. Minor problems and
questions would be handled by the staff while the major issues were passed along to
the Commissioners. After completing an investigation of their “area” the teams
would submit a written report that would comprise a chapter of the final Commission
Report. It should be noted that the Commission began its tenure with the assumption
that the FBI was correct as to the identity of the assassin. Lee Harvey Oswald was
the focus of the Warren Commission. No other suspects were entertained.86
Although the Commissioners had decided during their first meeting to pursue
an independent investigation, they were forced to rely upon the FBI for the actual
“police” work. An attempt to recruit a separate investigative unit would have been
too difficult and time consuming. However, on December 13, a Joint Resolution of
Congress was passed granting the Commission the power to subpoena witnesses and
to compel testimony by granting immunity. While this last power was never invoked,
the Commissioners did make frequent use of the subpoena power, calling various
witnesses to appear before them. Thus, the FBI evidence and witness testimony
would be the basis for the final report issued to the President.87 When the
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Commission submitted its final, and seemingly unanimous, Report to the President in
September of 1964, its conclusions followed the December 1963 FBI report rather
closely. The one major change involved the sequence of the bullets. Unlike the FBI
that claimed three shots, three hits, the Commission Report stated that the second shot
missed, hitting the curb and grazing a by-stander. The first shot, the so-called “magic
bullet,” hit both the President and Governor Connally. Over time, this one
discrepancy called the entire Report into question.

42

Chapter 3
Commissioner Russell
Russell and the Commission
A s evidence by his protests to Johnson, Richard Russell was not pleased to
have been drafted into service on the Warren Commission. A dedicated public
servant, Russell was concerned that the Commission’s work would interfere with his
other important duties, namely his service on the Armed Services Committee and his
leadership of the Southern Bloc. Aware that his former protege would soon be
introducing a new version of the late President Kennedy’s Civil Rights bill, Russell
felt that all of his considerable talents would be needed to defeat the bill. On
November 26, just days after Johnson assumed office, Russell wrote to a friend that
the new President had “gone all out, even further in some respects than President
Kennedy, on the racial issue,” and would work tirelessly for the passage of the
QO

“iniquitous ’ civil rights bill.

As seasoned politician, Russell quickly realized that

the Kennedy mystique and Johnson’s natural political abilities would result in the
adoption of many bills that Russell opposed. However, the Civil Rights bill was his
biggest fear and worry as 1963 drew to a close.
During the first few weeks following the assassination, Russell enjoyed
unprecedented access to the White House. Besides continuing his frequent dinners
with the Johnsons, Russell spent considerable amounts of time on the phone with
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Johnson daily. In a television interview with Cox Cable shortly before his death,
Russell described his astonishment at his continued relationship with the new
President.
My relationship with Johnson, I suppose, has been one o f the most
peculiar in American History. We had been very intimate friends in the
Senate and Johnson was such a can-do young man that I had pushed him fo r
all I was worth, and o f course, he finally changed his mind on a great many
issues that I did not change my mind on, and was President, and I didn’t
really expect, knowing that he knew and knew how I would respond to his
requests on these things if he made any, I really didn’t expect to have a very
close relationship with the President. But to my surprise our relations were
very close - almost altogether socially. We'd kid each other a little like we
had in the Senate, about our difference in views o f things. But President
Johnson is a man who doesn’t like to be by himself, and he would call me up,
not weekly, but pretty frequently, to come down there and have supper with
him. I ’d go down and w e’d sit around and have a highball and eat supper
and talk about things and people. He was always interested in people and
what they were doing. The people up there on the Hill, without getting into
any argument about the matters that we differed over. He was as kind to me
as a man could have been to his own father. He would call me about things,
well like the Dominican incident and things like that, the Panama Canal
controversy. He never did stop advising with me on things like that...89
When the Senator journeyed home to Winder, Georgia for the Christmas holiday,
messages from the President were waiting for him. Initially, much of their
conversation centered around Russell’s service on the Warren Commission. As
Russell loathed to assume any responsibility he could not totally fulfill, he pleaded
with the President to first appoint someone else and then later to replace him. For
Russell, time would be of a premium over the next few months. Understanding
Johnson as he did, the Georgia Senator realized that marshalling a defense against the
pending Civil Rights legislation would amount to a full-time job. However, time was
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not Russell’s only concern. The idea of serving under Chief Justice Earl Warren was
anathema to Russell, a staunch Southern Democrat. One of Warren’s main critics
since the 1954 Brown v. the Board o f Education ruling, Russell felt that the Chief
Justice has destroyed the integrity of the entire Supreme Court and impugned the
South. In an interesting twist, Earl Warren also had to be forcefully persuaded by
Johnson into service on the Commission.90
In letters to his constituents, Russell attempted to explain his stance on the
Commission. As Johnson’s had expected, Russell’s presence in the investigation
generated a great deal of confidence among individuals not just in Georgia, but
throughout the nation. In a letter to John Jones of California, Russell wrote that he
“did not seek appointment on the Commission to investigate the assassination of
President Kennedy” but that nevertheless he would do his “best to get to the truth of
this matter.”91 To another constituent, Russell explained that serving on the
Commission when added to his other Senate work was “very onerous and
disagreeable” but that he knew no way to “avoid the responsibility.”92 In the final
days of his life, Russell described those days to a reporter as “the most arduous four
or five months ” of his life. In Russell’s opinion, “all of the members of the
Commission were very anxious to get it off their shoulders, and the Chief Justice,
who was Chairman, did set a deadline.” The older Senator was “badly overloaded,
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undoubtedly more so than any man on the Commission” and was “in the midst of a
very long education campaign that many people called a filibuster on the Civil Rights
Bill.”93
Charged with leading the Southern bloc against the pending legislation,
Russell had little time to devote to the Commission’s investigation. Although he
attended the initial meeting and heard the first two witnesses, Russell was present for
only 6% of the testimony. In contrast, Allen Dulles was present for 71% and the
average for the entire Commission was 45% of the testimony.94 Present for the
important testimony of Governor Connally, Russell missed the appearance of such
important witnesses as J. Edgar Hoover, Robert Oswald and Marina Oswald.
Disturbed with missing Marina Oswald’s questioning, Russell managed to have her
recalled in September of 1964, less than a month before the official Report was
presented.
In a vain attempt to maintain at least a semblance of participation, Russell
engaged Alfredda Scobey, a legal clerk from Georgia, to attend the sessions and
report back to him. In addition, Russell made a concerted effort to read every line of
testimony himself, though he did question the reliability of such methods. Finally, in
February, overwhelmed by his duties both on and off the Commission, Russell
drafted a formal letter of resignation for President Johnson. Again citing his massive
workload, Russell respectfully asked to be relieved of his duties. Describing the past
few months, the Senator attempted to explain that given his experience as a trial
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lawyer, he understood the dangers inherent in evaluating testimony strictly from a
transcript without hearing the witness at all. Also, a continuing series of
miscommunications between Russell’s office and the Commission had caused a good
deal of distress. In particular, Russell was upset at not having been alerted about the
pending appearance of Robert Oswald, the alleged assassin’s older brother. Writing
that he did not find it “reasonable to expect anyone to serve on any commission that
does not notify all its members definitely as to the time of the meetings o f the group
and as to the identity of the witness that will appear,” Russell requested that the
President accept his resignation with the understanding that while Russell was always
at the service of his nation, he did not feel that circumstances would allow him “to
perform the important duties of membership on this Commission as thoroughly” as he
would have liked.95 In an echo of his service during the MacArthur hearings, Russell
never sent the letter of resignation and instead continued in his “part-time” service to
the Commission.

Early Concerns
In the early days of his service on the Commission, Russell expressed some
doubts as to the true motives of his fellow Commissioners, particularly the
Commission Chairman, Chief Justice Earl Warren. As one of two senators on a
quasi-oversight committee for the Central Intelligence Agency, Russell had been
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briefed by CIA Director John McCone about a possible connection between Oswald
and Castro. According to Alvarado Ugarte, a Nicaraguan agent, while in Mexico,
Oswald had received a large sum of money from the Cuban government to
assassinate President Kennedy. Although the FBI later concluded that the
information was false, Russell was shocked when Warren asked him about the
Mexico situation. The fact that the Chief Justice, aware of a connection to Mexico
City, knew more about the “Red Plot” and the “5 G” payment than Russell did,
disturbed the Senator. Russell seemed confused as to why the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court would have more knowledge of sensitive materials than the ranking
member of both the Armed Services Committee and the CIA Oversight Committee.
Russell was further troubled during the December 5, 1963 meeting of the
Commission by Warren’s seeming total acceptance of the FBI’s conclusion that
Oswald was a lone assassin. The fact that Warren was joined in the whole-hearted
belief by Deputy Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach raised additional questions.
Contemplating the matter, Russell wrote, “Something strange is happening. W. and
Katzenbach know all about F.B.I. and they are apparently [illegible] and others
planning to show Oswald only one considered.” To the Senator revered by his peers
for his honesty and integrity, this was “an untenable position.”96 Before the initial
meeting adjourned, Russell had managed to secure a call for an independent counsel.
Although Russell never questioned the idea that Oswald was indeed the assassin, he
did have some questions regarding a conspiracy. As early as his November 29th
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telephone conversation with Johnson, Russell speculated about possible Cuban
involvement. Discounting the idea that Khrushchev had played a part in the
assassination, Russell would not have been surprised if Castro had orchestrated the
murder.97 From his service on the CIA oversight committee, it would not be
surprising if Russell were aware of the various sabotage and assassination plots
directed by the CIA against Cuba and Castro. With this knowledge, it would not be
such a leap to speculate that Castro might have tried to remove Kennedy before one
of these missions succeeded.98
In addition to these concerns, Russell was worried about the amount of
information pertaining to the FBI report that was appearing in the press. During the
December 5th session, Russell pointedly asked just how much information the FBI
planned to leak to the press before the Commission could even begin to form its own
conclusions. Even though he was assured that the source of the leak was not the FBI,
Russell remained unconvinced as to the legitimacy of the FBI’s “cooperation.”99
When discussing the use of CIA information regarding Russia, Russell, having
worked with the CIA, expressed doubts as to whether the Agency would actually
provide the information requested. Stating that the other Commissioners had “more
faith” in the CIA than he did, Russell felt that any information from the CIA would be
doctored.100 In the early days of the investigation, these doubts combined to
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produce a skeptical Commissioner Russell. As time passed, these doubts would
combine with inconsistencies in the Commission’s conclusion to force the forthright
Russell into a confrontation with his colleagues that would influence one of the most
controversial documents in American history.

The Initial Dissent
On September 16, 1964, Richard Russell took the unexpected step of drafting
an official dissent to the final conclusions of the Warren Commission Report.
Unsatisfied with the Warren Commission’s findings, Russell was unwilling to place
his name and reputation behind a document in which he lacked full confidence. For
Russell, there were three main areas of concern. First, he refused to subscribe to the
idea that Kennedy and Governor Connally were struck by the same bullet. Although
agreeing that three shots were fired, Russell saw three hits, instead of the two the
Commission had decided upon. Russell also had unanswered questions and concerns
about Oswald’s ability to plan the assassination by himself. From the beginning,
Russell had expressed concern about the possibility of a Cuban connection to the
assassination. Combined with his distrust of Marina Oswald’s testimony, these three
factors formed the basis for a dissent that never came to light.

The “Single Bullet” Theory
When the FBI submitted CD-I to the Commission on December 9,1963, the
report contained the conclusion that there had been three shots and three hits. Two
bullets fired from the sixth floor of the Texas School Book Depository had struck
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President Kennedy and one had hit Governor Connally. For a time, the Commission
operated under this same assumption. Then, in January of 1964, Norman Redlich,
Melvin Eisenberg and Arlen Specter, all Commission staff members, met with a
series o f government photograph experts to analyze the recently released Zapruder
film. Abraham Zapruder, an amateur photographer, was taping the President’s
motorcade that fateful day in Dallas. From Zapruder’s film emerged a graphic
depiction of the entire assassination. Sold to Life Magazine and made into still
photographs, the film provided the American public with a stunning visual of the last
seconds of their President’s life. However, the presence of the Zapruder film created
problems for the Commission.
Meeting with the experts, the three staffers were attempting to discover
through photo analysis the exact position of the Presidential car at the moment of the
first shot. Frame by frame analysis showed that the latest point possible was frame
225, which showed evidence that the President had been injured. The earliest frame
was fixed by the position of an oak tree that would have blocked the view from the
Depository window between frame 166 and 207. As the President is still waving to
the crowd in frame 207, it seemed unlikely that he had been shot before frame 166.
However, pinpointing the position of the car for that first shot caused additional
problems. FBI tests had shown that the Mannlicher-Carcano rifle alleged to be the
murder weapon could not be fired twice in any less than 2.3 seconds or forty-two film
frames in Zapruder’s film. With this reasoning, if the first shot had taken place
during frame 207, the next shot could not come before 249 and still be fired from the

51
same weapon. Initially, the staffers concluded that Governor Connally was therefore
not hit until after frame 249 even though there is no evidence of a hit on the film 101
While this theory held initially, problems surfaced in February 1964 when the
staff obtained the original copy of the film from Life Magazine. Considerably more
detailed than the second generation copy of a copy the Commission had previously
used, these new films showed quite clearly that Governor Connally was struck before
frame 249. In addition, the Texas Governor’s doctors testified to the Commission
that Connally’s injuries were not consistent with his position in the film after frame
240. Therefore, there were only 33 frames between the shot that injured Kennedy and
the one that struck Connally, not enough time to have reloaded the alleged
assassination rifle. The staffers charged with investigating the facts of the
assassination, namely junior attorney Arlen Specter, now needed a new hypothesis to
explain how Oswald could still be a lone assassin.102
Discussing the problem with two o f the Naval doctors who performed the
Presidential autopsy, Specter found that it was medically possible for a single bullet
to have injured both men. This would have meant that the first bullet would have to
have struck the President and the exited from his body to hit Governor Connally.
However, the FBI report states that the autopsy did not reveal an exit wound for the
first shot. On March 16, 1964, Commander James J. Humes, one of the two doctors,
testified before the Commission and entered into evidence an undated autopsy report.
Humes claimed that the report was submitted to his superiors on November 24, 1963

101 Epstein, 114.
102 Epstein, 114.

52
and that previous notes and drafts had been destroyed at that time. This new report
stated, contrary to the FBI report, that the first bullet struck Kennedy in the back of
the neck and exited from his throat, whereby it would then have been able to inflict
Connally’s wounds. In contrast, the initial FBI report concluded that the first shot
had hit the President slightly below the shoulder and ‘“penetrated to a distance of less
than a finger’s length.’”103 Even though Humes testified that no bullet path had
actually been discovered, he had concluded deductively that the bullet had exited the
President’s body.104 Taking this line of reasoning one step further, Humes explained
that as Connally had been sitting directly in front of the President, the bullet exited
Kennedy’s throat and proceeded into Connally’s chest. The single bullet theory had
been bom.
Yet, even as the theory was advanced, it generated problems for Specter and
the staff. The FBI had reported the recovery of a pristine bullet, Commission Exhibit
399, from the President’s stretcher. In a January 27,1964 Executive Session, the
Commissioners discussed how a complete bullet could have been recovered from the
President’s stretcher. According to Senator Cooper, one doctor had stated that
manual massage in an attempt to resuscitate the President had dislodged the bullet
from his shoulder.105 As the FBI autopsy summary stated that the first shot had only
penetrated a finger’s length, this seemed a plausible explanation. However, during
the same discussion, Lee Rankin introduced the possibility that the bullet had been
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recovered from Connally’s stretcher, not Kennedy’s. At the time, this was an
unsubstantiated rumor that startled Russell.106 With the advent of the single bullet
theory, it became vital that C.E. 399 had indeed been recovered from Connally’s
stretcher, not the President’s. During the March meeting, Specter assured the
Commission that the evidence proved the bullet was recovered from Connally’s
stretcher. In fact, this was not the case. Colonel Finck, a forensic expert testified that
C.E. 399 could not possibly be the bullet that shattered Connally’s wrist. The number
of bullet fragments recovered from the Governor’s wrist totaled more than the
number o f fragments missing from C.E. 399, defeating the theory w ith simple
arithmetic. Yet, despite this glaring inconsistency, the single bullet theory
persisted. 107
In April of 1964, Governor Connally himself was called before the
Commission. Connally, a hunter familiar with fire-arms, swore under oath that he
could not possibly have been struck by the same bullet as Kennedy. Connally
distinctly remembered hearing the first shot before feeling the impact of a bullet. As
bullets travel faster than sound, Connally believed that he could not have been hit by
the first shot. The Governor’s wife, Mrs. Connally, also testified that she saw the
President grab his throat, a motion clearly visible in the Zapruder film, several
seconds before her husband was hit. Both the Governor’s testimony and that of Mrs.
Connally concur with the statements of more than one hundred eyewitnesses.108
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In addition, the account of by-stander James Tague made the single bullet
theory a virtual necessity. In January, Waggoner Carr, the Texas Attorney General,
relayed the Tague’s testimony and claim of injury by a “fourth shot” to Specter.
Although immediately following the assassination there had been a number of claims
that a bullet had missed the motorcade entirely striking the curb and injuring Tague
with a ricochet, these statements were discounted. In February, the Dallas Secret
Service reported to Specter that it was not possible for any fragment o f the three
bullets to have hit the concrete. The Tague issued seemed dead. However, in July of
1964, a photograph of the bullet creased curb found its way to the Commission,
creating an up-roar. Forensic tests in August proved conclusively that a bullet
fragment had struck the curb approximately 260 feet away from the limousine at the
time of the third shot. While the finished Report itself would carry a paragraph
stating that “the mark on the south curb of main Street cannot be identified
conclusively with any of the three shots fired,” both Rankin and Specter realized that
the single bullet theory had become the vital element of the entire investigation.109
Without the single bullet theory, the possibility of four shots and therefore a second
shooter existed. As only three cartridges had been recovered, it was vital that there
were only three shots. The hypothesis that the first shot had struck both Kennedy and
Connally was the only explanation for all o f the injuries and the missed shot that still
allowed for a lone assassin.
Russell, however, refused to believe the possibility that a single bullet could
entered Kennedy’s back, exited his throat, entered and exited Connally’s chest,
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shattered his wrist, lodged in his thigh and emerged almost completely intact. For
Russell, the idea of three shots and three hits seemed much more plausible. Although
“the expert testimony based on measurements and surveys, including reenactment o f
the motortrip of the Presidential party on that fateful November 22nd presents a
persuasive case,” Russell found the number of variables in the calculations to be
suspect. The movement of either individual by just a few inches would have had a
decided impact on the results. Instead, Russell wrote that “the testimony o f Governor
Connally that he heard the first shot fired and strike the President and turned before
he himself was wounded makes more logical a finding that the first and third shots
struck the President and the second shot wounded Governor Connally.”110 For
Russell, the Zapruder film added to his “conviction that the bullet that passed through
Governor Connally’s body was not the same bullet as that which passed through the
President’s back and neck.”111
Besides the simple logic of this reasoning, Russell found it difficult to believe
that a marksman who could inflict such deadly wounds to Kennedy could entirely
miss the motorcade with his second shot. However, Russell’s dissent does contain
one glaring inaccuracy. Perhaps due to his poor attendance record, Russell appeared
to have no knowledge of James Tague’s statement to both the Dallas Police and the
Secret Service. As further evidence for his dissatisfaction with the single bullet
hypothesis, Russell stated that there was no evidence of any shot within “several feet
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of paved street on each side of the Presidential car.”112 Perhaps Russell was not
aware o f the “Tague bullet” or perhaps he simply considered a bullet that missed by
260 feet to be unworthy of such a marksman. In either case, the fact remains that
Russell failed to understand that the viability of the entire Report rested upon the
acceptance of the single bullet theory. Even if Tague were injured by a fragment of
the fatal third shot, the idea that two bullets had struck the President while one hit
Connally would require the presence of a second shooter, something the Commission
wished to avoid at all costs as it implied a conspiracy. To propose a possible
conspiracy was both to question the abilities of the FBI and to create a sense of fear
and doubt in the nation.

Marina Oswald and The Cuban Connection
Although not specifically detailed in his unpublished dissent, in later years,
Richard Russell came to publicly doubt the veracity of the testimony given by Marina
Oswald, Lee Harvey Oswald’s widow and a Soviet national. In his Cox Cable
“farewell address,” Russell described the Commission’s dealings with Marina as
limited at best. In his opinion, her questioning before the Commission was not as
rigorous as it should have been. In fact, he believed that “Chief Justice Warren rather
took the grandfather attitude toward her when she was before the Commission and
Mr. Rankin was not very vigorous” in his line of questioning. By late summer 1964
with the Civil Rights battle completed, Russell had much more time and energy to
turn to the Warren investigation.
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Even though the official Report was due in a matter of weeks, Russell
managed to convince the other Commissioners to create a subcommittee of sorts to
reinterview Marina Oswald in September o f 1964. Having missed the widow’s
original appearance before the Commission in June, Russell spearheaded the group
which consisted of himself, Senator John Sherman Cooper and Representative Hale
Boggs. During the four hours spent at the U.S. Naval Air Station in Dallas, Russell
asked Marina Oswald repeatedly about her late husband’s contacts with foreign
agents in both Russia and Cuba. He was also particularly concerned with Oswald’s
contacts with Cubans in the United States and his work with the Fair Play for Cuba
Committee. Much less “grandfatherly” than Warren, Russell subjected Marina
Oswald to forty minutes of intense cross-examination that impressed his Senate
colleague, John Sherman Cooper.
Although Russell wrote that he agreed with this colleagues that there was “no
clear and definite evidence connecting any person or group in a conspiracy with
Oswald to assassinate the President,” there were some parts of the investigation that
he could not resolve “with absolute certainty due to the fact that any such evidence, if
it exists,” was beyond the reach of the Commission or the various investigative
agencies.”113 Primarily, Russell was concerned with Oswald’s connection to the large
number of Cuban students in Minsk, the city in Russia where Oswald lived for
several years.
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From his very early conversations with President Johnson, it w as evident that
Russell felt that Castro may have been behind the assassination.114 Given Russell’s
experience with the CIA oversight committee, it would not have come as a complete
surprise to him. However, the FBI quickly quashed the rumors of a Cuban
connection during Oswald’s pre-assassination trip to Mexico City. Nevertheless,
Russell was fixated on the possible connection between Minsk, Oswald’s home
during his stay in Russia, and Castro’s Cuba. In addition to the six to seven hundred
Cuban students residing in Minsk, Russell was disturbed by rumors o f a Soviet
intelligence and/or sabotage school in the city.
Minsk, the capital and heart of the Belorussian Republic, was virtually
destroyed during World War II. Rebuilt after the war, the city was one of Stalin’s
“showcases” for the viability of a communist system. In addition to being an
important industrial center, Minsk also contained several institutions o f higher
learning. With the Academy of Sciences o f the USSR located within its limits, Minsk
was an important academic research center. In addition to Russian students, Minsk
attracted a large population of Cuban students. The fact that Lee Harvey Oswald
resided in Minsk together with these Cuban students aroused Russell’s suspicions.
Finding little satisfaction in the information provided to the Commission,
Russell persuaded fellow Commissioner Allen Dulles, former director of the CIA, to
obtain any information in the CIA files pertaining to Minsk. What Russell hoped to
find is unclear as he had previously expressed little confidence in the CIA’s
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dedication to the truth.115 The documents the CIA provided in answer to this inquiry
show that there had indeed been an Intelligence/Sabotage school in Minsk. However,
according to CIA files, information provided by a Soviet defector in 1949 confirmed
the existence of such an installation as of 1947. After 1949, there is no mention of
the continued existence of such a training facility. A further search of the CIA
archive revealed references to the presence of a sabotage school in Minsk until the
1941 German attack when the school was moved to Leningrad.116
Russell, it appears, was never satisfied with these explanations. In his final
television interview, Russell stated that he “never believed that Oswald planned that
altogether by himself. There were too many things, the fact when he was at Minsk,
and that was the principal center for educating Cuban students. There were 600 or
700 there. He was very close to some of them and the trip that he made to Mexico
City and a number of discrepancies in the evidence as to, or conflicts in the evidence
as to his means of transportation, the luggage he had, and whether or not anyone was
with him, caused me to have doubts that he planned it all by himself. I think someone
else worked with him.”

In addition to the time Oswald spent in Russia and his

controversial trip to Mexico, “there were so many circumstances, one of them being
that he was a Free Cuba, a defender of Cuba, and went on the radio in New Orleans
and got out pamphlets and handed them out on the streets, and there were so many
circumstances there that” led Russell to believe that the Commission or any rational
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individual could not “just completely eliminate the possibility that he did have some
co-conspirators.” 117

September 18,1964
With these points before him, Richard Russell forced a final Executive
Session o f the Warren Commission. His main agenda was to present his prepared
dissent and to refuse to sign the Commission Report unless his dissent was included.
After presenting his concerns, Russell was joined in his dissent by Senator John
Sherman Cooper and to a lesser extent Representative Boggs. In an oral history
conducted late in his life, Senator Cooper recalled that Russell’s well reasoned
opinions “had great influence” on Cooper’s own conclusions. Like Russell, Cooper
was impressed by the strong and compelling testimony of Governor Connally and
thus was willing to follow Russell’s lead in rejecting the “single bullet” theory.118
Cooper it seems was also struck by Russell’s emphatic refusal to sign a statement that
categorically concluded that one bullet had struck both Kennedy and Connally.
Although he did not go so far as to prepare a written dissent, Cooper was willing to
join Russell in a minority report.
A head count at this point in the debate showed the Commission to be almost
evenly divided. To varying degrees, Jerry Ford, Allen Dulles and John McCloy
found the “single bullet” theory persuasive. Russell, Cooper and Boggs stood in
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opposition. Realizing the dangers of releasing a majority and minority opinion in
such an important investigation, McCloy set about brokering a compromise.
Appealing to Russell’s sense of national interest, McCloy convinced the doubters that
the Report must be unanimous. After drafting several statements, Russell and Ford,
argued over the terms “credible evidence” as supported by Russell and “compelling
evidence” as suggested by Ford.119 After some additional haggling over the language,
the two finally accepted McCloy’s statement that:
there is very persuasive evidence [author's italics]from the experts to
indicate that the same bullet which pierced the President's throat also caused
Governor Connally's wounds. However, Governor Connally's testimony and
certain other factors have given rise to some difference o f opinion [author's
italics] as to this probability but there is no question in the mind o f any
member o f the Commission that all the shots which caused the President's and
Governor Connally's wounds were fired from the sixth floor window o f the
Texas School Book Depository.120
Having addressed the first of Russell’s concerns, the Commission then turned
to a discussion of a conspiracy. While the original draft of the Report stated quite
clearly that there was “no conspiracy,” Russell was dissatisfied with such a
categorical statement. In his prepared statement, Russell agreed with his fellow
Commissioners that there was “no clear and definite evidence connecting any person
1^1

or group in a conspiracy with Oswald to assassinate the President.”

However, in

recalling the meeting, Senator Cooper remarked that Russell was concerned that
“there may be some other evidence in the future” and that the Commission could not
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“categorically close the door to the facts that may arise.”122 Ever conscious of his
duty to history, Russell wanted to qualify the Commission’s conclusions rather than
issue any definitive statements. Again, John McCloy stepped into the discussion to
propose a compromise in the interests of unanimity. Rejecting Ford’s suggestion of a
statement finding “no evidence” of a conspiracy, McCloy’s language read:
Because o f the difficulty ofproving negatives to a certainty the possibility o f
others being involved with either Oswald or Ruby cannot be rejected
categorically, but if there is any such evidence it has been beyond the reach o f
all investigative agencies and resources o f the United States and has not come
to the attention o f this Commission. ”m
Russell, the lifelong public servant, was well aware of the need for national
unity. Much in the same fashion as his dealings with the MacArthur hearings, Russell
was willing to compromise full disclosure for the national good. However, he did
want to make a record for history. Bowing to McCloy’s “little old threat” about the
dangers of a divided report, Russell agreed to sign a Report that clearly stated that
there was divisipn over the “single bullet” theory while still maintaining that Oswald
was the lone assassin. After leaving the meeting, Russell clearly relayed this opinion
in a conversation with President Johnson.124 Obviously upset about the outcome of
the meeting, Russell had decided to fly home to Georgia. To Johnson, he confided
that “that danged Warren Commission business” had “whupped” him so much that he
had forgotten to pack his medication and clothes.

Discussing the nature of the final

Report, Russell clearly believed that the final draft would show the disagreement over
the “single bullet” theory.

122 Cooper Oral History, 54.
123 WC Report, 22.
124 Beschloss, 560.
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The Light of Day
After the final Commission Report was delivered to the President on
September 24, 1964, the Commission was disbanded and the members had little
reason to review the final draft. Had Russell done this, he would have noticed
immediately that it contained no mention of any dissent over the “single bullet”
theory. His objections were only evident in the change to the phrase “persuasive
evidence,” when discussing the sequence of the wounds.126 However, the busy
Senator resumed his Congressional duties assuming that his opinion had been
documented and taken into account.
The duplicity of the Commission staff was brought to Russell’s attention in
1968, more than three years after the Commission’s Report was published. Harold
Weisberg, a Senate investigator turned Warren Commission critic, approached the
Senator with questions about the September 18th Executive Session. Weisberg, who
had written several books critiquing the Warren report, had been lobbying the
National Archives for some time in an attempt to gain access to all of the Warren
Commission transcripts. In a letter dated May 20,1968, James B. Rhoads, Archivist
for the United States, informed Weisberg that no verbatim transcript of the September
18th meeting existed. There was a structured account of general business being
conducted by the Commission, but nowhere in it was there any mention of Russell’s

125 Beschloss, 559.
126 WC Report, 19.
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dissent o r any discussion of altered language. Russell’s attempt to document his
doubts fo r history had been foiled.127
During a chance meeting with Russell in June of 1968, W eisberg learned
about the Senator’s doubts. Eager to explore the matter further, W eisberg composed
a letter informing Russell of what the Archives had to offer. Citing the statement that
no verbatim account existed, Weisberg confronted the Senator with the fact that the
questions “raised about the draft of the Report no longer existed.”128 The official
transcript record of Russell’s doubts, as well as those of Cooper and Boggs, had been
expunged from the historic record. In a series of correspondence, Weisberg supplied
Russell’s assistant C.E. Campbell with copies of his own works as w ell as a copy of
the letter and transcript from the National Archive.
Summarizing the information for the Senator, Campbell concluded that, if the
transcript provided by Weisberg was the only record in the National Archives, it
would seem that there was “a very serious matter” to confront. Campbell seemed to
realize that as there were verbatim transcripts available for the other Executive
Session, the absence of the September 18th meeting was a very serious question.
Reading the provided transcript in question, Campbell immediately saw that it was

127 The Warren Commission Executive Sessions, 18 September 1964, Series XIII; Subseries A; Box 1
(Kennedy Assassination); Commission Correspondence, 1969-1970 (Richard B. Russell Papers,
Special Collections Division, Richard B. Russell Memorial Library, University o f Georgia, Athens,
Georgia).
128 Harold Weisberg to Richard B. Russell, 6 June 1968, Series XIII; Subseries A; Box 1 (Kennedy
Assassination); Commission Correspondence, 1969-1970 (Richard B. Russell Papers, Special
Collections Division, Richard B. Russell Memorial Library, University o f Georgia, Athens, Georgia).

65
“inadequate” as there was no mention of Russell’s “exceptions to the first proposed
draft o f the Report.”129
Early in the life of the Commission, the members decided that all Executive
Sessions would be recorded by Ward & Paul, an established Washington firm.
♦Vi

During the September 18 meeting, Russell recalled the presence of a woman in the
room and assumed she was the official stenographer sent by Ward & Paul. However,
she was not. A survey of the Ward & Paul records show that the last session the firm
billed for was the September 15th deposition of John F. Gallagher.130 Thus, it is
possible to assume that the presence of a “stenographer” was meant to deceive
Russell and the other dissenters into assuming that the meeting was being conducted
as usual. However, the presence of a doctored transcript proves that someone, most
likely General Counsel Lee Rankin, assured that there would be no record of
dissension in the ranks.
When confronted with the unmistakable proof of a hoax, Russell was shocked
and appalled. Having served in Washington for decades, Russell could never have
imagined such treatment. Coincidently, or perhaps not, Russell resigned his
chairmanship of the Military Affairs committee as well as his position on the CIA
quasi-oversight committee shortly after learning about the September 18th fraud. In a
letter dated January 7, 1969, Russell expressed an interest in continuing the “case.”
However, due to his recent promotion to Chairman of the Senate Appropriations

129 C.E. Campbell to Richard B. Russell, 14 June 1968 Series XIII; Subseries A; Box 1 (Kennedy
Assassination); Commission Correspondence, 1969-1970 (Richard B. Russell Papers, Special
Collections Division, Richard B. Russell Memorial Library, University of Georgia, Athens, Georgia).
130 McKnight, 19 citing Ward & Paul File (Harold Weisberg Archive, Hood College, Maryland).
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committee and his election as President pro tempore of the Senate, he simply lacked
the time to continue to pursue the matter himself.131
When Russell returned to Georgia in 1970 to film his “farewell address” to
his constituents, he knew that he was dying of lung cancer. Seizing this final
opportunity to make his position known, Russell stated quite plainly that he was “was
not satisfied with several aspects of the report.”132 Ending the facade of unanimity
the Commission staff had worked hard to present, Russell told the interviewer that he
had “refused to sign the report until they up in the clause [sic] - even though he had
“drawn a much stronger” statement, he recounted how he “finally agreed to sign if
they would put a clause in there that [the Commission] had exhausted all the evidence
that was available..., and that any evidence that might disclose a conspiracy was
beyond the jurisdiction o f ’ the investigative agencies including the Dallas police, the
FBI and the Secret Service.133 When asked to speculate about a possible conspiracy,
Russell simply stated that he was “not prepared to say, because” the Commission did
not have access to “enough evidence to pin it down.” But, Russell was never
completely satisfied in his “own mind that he [Oswald] did plan and commit this act
altogether on his own, without consultation with anyone else. And that’s what a
majority of the Commission wanted to find.”134

131 Richard B. Russell to Harold Weisberg, 7 January 1969, Series XIII; Subseries A; Box 1 (Kennedy
Assassination); Commission Correspondence, 1969-1970 (Richard B. Russell Papers, Special
Collections Division, Richard B. Russell Memorial Library, University o f Georgia, Athens, Georgia).
132 Cox interview.
133 Cox interview.
134 Cox interview.
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The Ripples
In uttering those few words to a Georgia cable reporter, Russell set forth a
series o f ripples that would have profound implications for the future. Having been
denied his chance to leave evidence of his own thoughts in the historic record of the
Commission, Russell took his views straight to the American people. Ever concerned
with the business of history, Russell felt that his obligations to his constituents
required that he, as a member of the Commission, do his “best to get to the truth of
this matter.”135 By making his dissent public, Russell sought to ensure that those
who regarded him as an example of honor and integrity in government understood
that Richard Russell had done his best with the evidence before the Commission.
In stating his main concerns with the Commission’s report, namely the “single
bullet” hypothesis and the lone assassin theory, Russell underscored the thoughts of
many still unconvinced Americans. Russell, had he lived, and others would
experience a brief moment of vindication in the late 1970s. Perhaps sparked by the
ripples created by Russell’s public dissent, the finding of the House Select Committee
on Assassinations in 1979 concluded that “The Warren Commission failed to

135 Richard B. Russell to Joseph E. Clifford 7 December 1963, Series XIII; Subseries A; Box
Assassinations Commission Correspondence Nov 1963- Oct. 1964 ; File 10 12/7/63 (Richard B.
Russell Papers, Special Collections Division, Richard B. Russell Memorial Library, University of
Georgia, Athens, Georgia).
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investigate adequately the possibility of a conspiracy to assassinate the President.”136
In addition, the Committee found that “scientific acoustical evidence establishes a
high probability that two gunmen fired at President John F. Kennedy,” while “other
scientific evidence does not preclude the possibility of two gunmen firing at the
President.”137
Eight years after his death, Russell’s central concern involving the Warren
Commission came to pass. The evidence was evaluated by a second body and the
Commission’s work was found wanting. However, while the House Committee’s
conclusions were shocking and generated headlines, there were few other
ramifications. The Commission had done its job too well. Although there had been
the doubters and the critics as foreseen by FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover during his
Commission appearance in May 1964, most were dismissed as paranoid lunatics and
conspiracy theorists.138 While the dissent of such a prominent figure as Richard
Russell lent a certain legitimacy to various critics, the majority had been all too
effective in guiding public opinion. The wide variety of books and films proposing a
host of conspiracies and other theories had numbed an increasingly jaded public to
new findings. Ironically, this glut of information resulted largely from the very
suspicions and rumors the Commission attempted to quell. However, the very
existence and continued popularity of this material does indicate a certain level of

136 Final Report o f the Select Committee on Assassinations o f the U.S. House o f Representatives, 95th
Congress, 2nd Session. (Copies from Harold Weisberg Archive, Hood College, Maryland), 5.
(hereafter cited as House Report)
137 House Report, 2.
138 Investigation o f the Assassination o f President John F. Kennedy, Hearings Before the President’s
Commission on the Assassination o f President Kennedy (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Printing Office,
1964, vol. 5, (99-101).
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popular dissatisfaction with the Commission’s ultimate findings. And yet, partly
because of the stigma attached to so-called “conspiracy theorists,” there has been a
severe lack of any serious, academic critiques of the Commission’s conclusions.
While the violent murder of the young charismatic American President on a
Dallas street was a tragedy of epic proportions, the event was made even more
horrific by the investigation that followed. Perhaps out of a warped sense of national
duty or because of some nefarious plot, elements of the government collaborated to
create a simple story that ended with the death of Lee Harvey Oswald. If Oswald
alone were responsible for Kennedy’s assassination, the country could be spared the
pain of a very public investigation and trial. Yet, in failing to truly investigate, the
Warren Commission deprived the American public of the truth it rightly deserved.
Perhaps the culminating tragedy in sequence begun in Dallas was that Richard
Russell, quite possibly the only member with the power to effect any policy change,
was delinquent in his duty to the Commission. Engaged in a doomed battle against
the Civil Rights bill, Russell did not give the investigation the attention that might
have made a difference. However, at the end of his life, Russell did set his thoughts
into the permanent record. Now all that remains is for the spirit of American history
to judge the actions of the first dissenter.
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